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by Anna L. Paulson, senior ﬁ  nancial economist
This article describes what sovereign wealth funds do, where their funding comes from, 
and what drives their investment strategies. It also highlights some of the policy issues 
that their activities raise.
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Sovereign wealth funds are 
investment funds controlled 
by governments.
In their efforts to weather the subprime 
crisis and shore up balance sheets, many 
commercial and investment banks have 
been raising new capital. One important 
source of new capital has come from sov-
ereign wealth funds (SWFs). For exam-
ple, Morgan Stanley received $5 billion 
from the Chinese SWF China Investment 
Corporation. The United Arab Emirates’ 
SWF Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 
purchased a 4.9% equity share in Citibank, 
and Merrill Lynch received $5 billion 
from Singapore’s Temasek Holdings.  
While there is no generally agreed upon 
deﬁ  nition of an SWF, the U.S. Department 
of the Treasury deﬁ  nes SWFs as govern-
ment investment vehicles funded by for-
eign exchange assets that are managed 
separately from ofﬁ  cial reserves.1 More 
colloquially, SWFs are investment funds 
controlled by governments. One example 
is the Norwegian Government Pension 
Fund; much of its funding comes from 
oil revenues. Other SWFs such as the 
Government of Singapore Investment 
Corporation are funded through foreign 
exchange reserves. 
In addition to their recent investments 
in global ﬁ  nancial institutions, SWFs are 
of interest because of their size and their 
potential to grow even larger. Figure 1 
lists the ten largest funds, their sponsor-
ing countries, their estimated value in 
U.S. dollars, their source of funds, and 
the year when each fund was established, 
according to a recent study.2 The largest 
funds are quite large. For example, Abu 
Dhabi’s fund manages $875 billion in 
assets, and Norway’s fund has $380 bil-
lion assets under management. There 
are approximately 40 SWFs in total, and 
collectively they are estimated to manage 
$3.6 trillion dollars. Assets under manage-
ment are projected to reach $10 trillion 
by 2012 if recent trends continue.3 To 
put this in perspective, approximately 
$1.4 trillion is managed worldwide by 
hedge funds, $15 trillion by pension funds, 
$16 trillion by insurance companies, and 
$21 trillion by investment companies.4  
Why would a country start an SWF? 
First of all, the country typically has sub-
stantial funds to invest. One prominent 
source of funds is commodities. Many 
oil-exporting countries started commod-
ity stabilization funds in the 1970s and 
1980s as a way to reduce the impact of 
changes in oil prices on government 
budgets. Over time, especially when oil 
prices increased, the balances in the com-
modity stabilization funds grew beyond 
what was needed for commodity stabili-
zation. Other countries generated sub-
stantial foreign exchange reserves from 
large net exports. Given these funds, 
the countries that control them have 
decided to create SWFs that use global 
ﬁ  nancial markets to help them meet 
their investment goals. 
For the sponsoring countries, SWFs can 
perform several useful functions. A recent 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)     1. Large sovereign wealth funds
       Estimated
 Sponsoring      assets    Year 
  country  Name of fund  ($ billions)  Source of funds  started
  1  Abu Dhabi (United  Abu Dhabi
    Arab Emirates)  Investment Authority  875  Oil  1976
 2 Norway  Government  Pension  380  Oil  1990
     Fund  –Global    
 
  3  Singapore  Government of Singapore   330  Noncommodity  1981
     Investment  Corporation
 
  4  Saudi Arabia  Saudi Arabian   300  Oil  n.a.
     Monetary  Agency 
  5  Kuwait  Kuwait Investment Authority  250  Oil  1953
 
 6 China  China  Investment  Corporation  200  Noncommodity  2007 
 
  7  China   Hong Kong Monetary  163  Noncommodity  1993
    (Hong Kong)  Authority Investment Portfolio
 8 Singapore  Temasek  Holdings  159  Noncommodity  1974
  9  Australia  Australian Future Fund  61  Noncommodity  2004
 
 10  Qatar  Qatar  Investment  Authority  60  Oil  2003
NOTES: n.a. means not applicable. For Saudi Arabia, this represents some of the funds that are managed by the country’s central bank.
SOURCES: Chhaochharia and Laeven (2008); and Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, www.swﬁ  nstitute.org.
report5 lists ﬁ  ve potentially overlap-
ping functions of SWFs:
Stabilization funds established by 
commodity-rich countries to insulate 
federal spending from commodity 
price ﬂ  uctuations;
Savings funds that share wealth 
across generations by investing the 
proceeds from nonrenewable assets 
(often oil) into a variety of assets 
to fund long-term objectives and 
future generations;
Reserve investment corporations 
that are designed to increase the 
net returns to holding foreign ex-
change reserves;
Development funds that are designed 
to fund infrastructure and other 
socioeconomic projects; and
Pension reserve funds that invest 
to fund the government’s pension-
like liabilities.
Like other investors, SWFs hope to achieve 
these goals by using ﬁ  nancial markets 
to diversify risk, to transfer funds through 
time, and to maximize returns.
SWF investments in ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms
One reason that SWFs have received a lot 
of attention in the popular press is be-
cause of their recent high-proﬁ  le invest-
ments in developed countries’ ﬁ  nancial 
institutions. Some of the most prominent 
investments are highlighted in ﬁ  gure 2. 
This ﬁ  gure lists the ﬁ  rm that received the 
investment, the SWF that made the in-
vestment, the date of the investment, the 
size of the investment, the percentage of 
the ﬁ  rm’s equity that the SWF acquired, 
the percentage change in the ﬁ  rm’s share 
price since the investment, and the per-
centage change in the Standard and 
Poor’s (S&P) Financial Index over the 
same time period. These investments have 
helped a number of systemically impor-
tant ﬁ  nancial institutions raise critical new 
capital. They have also heightened the 
scrutiny of SWFs and raised concerns 
about the desirability of these investments.  
Others have been concerned that this ad-
ditional scrutiny combined with the poor 
performance of these recent investments 
(see the sixth column of ﬁ  gure 2) will 






to invest in ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms at a time when 
many need to raise new capital. Figure 2 
shows that the stock prices of the ﬁ  rms 
that have received SWF investments 
(with the exception of Credit Suisse’s) 
are performing somewhat worse than 
the ﬁ  nancial sector as a whole (see the 
last column of ﬁ  gure 2), perhaps reﬂ  ect-
ing the tendency of SWFs to invest in 
companies that are in ﬁ  nancial distress.   
Concerns about SWFs
Because SWFs are controlled by govern-
ments, critics have been concerned that 
their investment strategies may be polit-
ically motivated and potentially conﬂ  ict 
with the national interests of the coun-
tries in which they invest. These concerns 
have increased with the size of the SWF 
sector and with the establishment of SWFs 
by strategically important countries, such 
as China and Russia.6 Sponsoring coun-
tries argue that SWFs are motivated by 
a desire to maximize investment returns, 
not political ones. 
Because many SWFs do not publicly reveal 
their investments, the evaluation of these 
claims has proven difﬁ  cult. Anecdotal ev-
idence suggests there may be some cause 
for concern. For example, in a deal that 
was meant to be secret, China agreed 
to buy $300 million Costa Rican bonds 
as an incentive for Costa Rica to drop its 
diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in favor 
of China instead.7 Other SWF transactions 
that have generated controversy include 
Temasek Holdings’ (Singapore) purchase 
of the telecom businesses of then Thai 
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.8 
Less political, but still potentially at odds 
with maximizing risk-adjusted returns, 
Norway’s SWF has a policy against in-
vestment in certain arms manufacturers, 
and in 2005, that fund sold its stake in 
Wal-Mart, citing human rights concerns.9 
Other anecdotes suggest that SWFs go 
to great lengths to ensure that they will 
be seen as passive investors. For example, 
after acquiring a $3 billion stake in the 
Blackstone Group (a major global alter-
native asset manager and provider of 
ﬁ  nancial advisory services) in 2007, the 
China Investment Corporation refused 
a seat on its board.10 Similarly, the 
Government of Singapore Investment 
Corporation refused a seat on the board 
of UBS after acquiring a substantial stake 
in the global ﬁ  nancial services company.11 
A recent Monitor Group study of 420 
publicly reported equity investments by 
SWFs since 2000 found that half in-
volved the purchase of majority stakes.12 
This study suggests that the recent SWF 
investments in ﬁ  nancial institutions, which Charles L. Evans, President; Daniel G. Sullivan, 
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  2. Performance of selected SWF investments in ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms  
         %  %  change
       Equity    change  in  S&P
 Sovereign  Date  of  Investment  stake  in  share  Financial
Firm  wealth fund(s)  investment  ($ billions)   (%)  price  Index
Credit Suisse  Qatar Investment   2/18/2008  0.5  2.0  –34.16  –43.84
 Authority
Barclays  Qatar Investment   6/25/2008  3.5  8.9  –44.61  –31.30
 Authority 
Citigroup   Abu Dhabi  11/26/2007  7.5  4.9  –61.28  –46.59
(round 1)  Investment Authority 
Citigroup   Government of   1/14/2008  7.9  5.2  –60.36  –46.14
(round 2)  Singapore Investment
  Corporation and Kuwait 
 Investment  Authority 
UBS  Government of   12/10/2007  9.7  9.0  –71.91  –52.71
 Singapore  Investment
 Corporation 
Morgan Stanley  China Investment   12/19/2007  5.0  9.9  –69.27  –48.23
 Corporation 
Merrill Lynch   Temasek  12/19/2007  5.0  9.9  –70.35  –48.23
(round 1)  Holdings 
Merrill Lynch   Kuwait Investment  1/15/2008  8.9  5.4  –69.38  –44.07
(round 2)  Authority and Korea 
 Investment  Corporation 
NOTES: The numbered rounds indicate rounds of investment by sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). The sixth column shows the change 
in share prices between the date of investment and November 5, 2008; the seventh column shows the change in the Standard and 
Poor’s (S&P) Financial Index over the same period.
SOURCES: Steffen Kern, 2008, “SWFs and foreign investment policies—An update,” Current Issues, Deutsche Bank Research, October 22; 
and author’s calculations based on Bloomberg quotes and Standard and Poor’s Financial Index.
generally involved purchase of stakes 
of less than 10%, were not typical. 
Regulation and transparency
In addition to the steps that SWFs them-
selves take to avoid controversy, their in-
vestments may be scrutinized through 
various laws and regulations. For example, 
the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s 
Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States reviews foreign invest-
ments to ensure that they do not compro-
mise national security. In the summer 
of 2007, the U.S. Congress enacted new 
legislation, aimed at SWFs, that requires 
additional scrutiny and higher-level 
clearances for transactions involving 
foreign government control.13 
Investments in U.S. banks and bank hold-
ing companies are potentially subject to 
additional review. Investments in U.S. 
banks and bank holding companies by 
SWFs that meet certain criteria—includ-
ing having substantial control of voting 
shares or the board of directors—trigger 
regulatory review under the Bank Holding 
Company Act and the Change in Bank 
Control Act.14 To date, SWF investments 
in U.S. banks have been structured to 
avoid these triggers. 
In addition to political questions, there is 
also a concern that SWFs, which are con-
trolled by governments, may not allocate 
capital as efﬁ  ciently as private ﬁ  rms. A re-
cent study of SWF behavior suggests that 
this is a real issue. Chhaochharia and 
Laeven (2008) ﬁ  nd that SWFs diversify 
risk by investing in industries that are un-
derrepresented in the sponsoring country 
but that they also tend to invest in coun-
tries that share religious outlooks with 
their own. This suggests that proﬁ  t max-
imization is not the only objective of 
some SWFs. 
More generally, the fact that some SWFs 
do not disclose their investment strate-
gies—i.e., precisely how much money they 
manage or how it has been invested—
makes it very difﬁ  cult to systematically 
evaluate whether SWF investment strat-
egies are inﬂ  uenced by political concerns 
or are otherwise inefﬁ  cient. This lack of 
transparency is exacerbated by SWF in-
vestments in other opaque entities, such 
as hedge funds and private equity funds. 
A recent study by Kotter and Lel15 sug-
gests that SWFs pay a price for their lack 
of transparency. They ﬁ  nd that the an-
nouncement of an SWF investment is 
typically associated with a positive stock 
price response. However, they also show 
that the increase in stock prices is larger 
when the SWF doing the investment is 
more transparent.
Policy responses 
In response to concerns about lack of 
transparency and the potential for polit-
ically motivated investments, international 
efforts have been initiated to develop 
best practices and voluntary codes of con-
duct for both SWFs and the countries 
that receive SWF investments. Efforts 
sponsored by the International Monetary 
Fund have led to the establishment of 
a set of 24 principles that SWFs that par-
ticipated in the IMF talks have voluntarily 
agreed to follow.16 These principles in-
clude a commitment to ﬁ  nancial objec-
tives and guidelines for better transparency 
and disclosure of SWF relationships 
with the sponsoring government. The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) is working 
to develop a set of standards for coun-
tries that receive SWF investments to en-
sure that they are evaluated on an equal 
basis as other investments and to make 
sure that recipient countries’ policies do not create barriers to efﬁ  cient ﬂ  ows 
of capital across borders.17 
Conclusion
Over the longer term, both the sponsors 
of SWFs and the countries they invest in 
are likely to proﬁ  t from policies that 
carefully balance strategic interests with 
the beneﬁ  ts of allowing for the efﬁ  cient 
ﬂ  ow of capital across borders. Increased 
transparency on the part of SWFs with 
regard to investment strategies, holdings, 
and performance appears to beneﬁ  t 
SWFs in the form of higher investment 
returns, and this increased transparency 
will also boost conﬁ  dence that SWFs’ 
investment strategies are driven by ﬁ  nan-
cial rather than political factors. 
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